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ABSTRACT
In this paper we explore the need to understand the human-
behavioral factors within an organization’s information se-
curity management processes. We frame this investigation
around development of an information security ontology.
This ontology is intended for use within organizations that
aim not only to maintain compliance with external stan-
dards, but also to consider and adjust the attitude towards
security as exhibited by those within the organization. We
provide an ontology that combines information security stan-
dards (in this case ISO27002) and representation of the human-
behavioral implications of information security management
decisions.
Our ontology explicitly represents the human-behavioral
concerns attached to specific security processes and policy
decisions. As such it encourages consideration of the security
behavior of individuals towards technical security controls.
We demonstrate use of our ontology with an applied exam-
ple concerning management of an organization’s password
policy. This example illustrates how password configuration
may be perceived by individuals within the organization,
and how this perception alters their behavior and conse-
quently the attitude to information security in the work-
place.
Keywords
information security ontology, human behavioral implica-
tions, password policy
1. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly organizations are looking to external, industry-
recognized best-practice standards for advice on how best
to manage their information security infrastructures (e.g.
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the ISO27K series, including [1, 2]). By seeking compliance
(and in some cases certification) with standards, an organi-
zation can not only demonstrate that their information is
that much more secure, but also illustrate to customers and
business partners alike that they can be trusted to protect
important information.
One shortcoming of applying information security stan-
dards in a “one-size-fits-all” manner is that there is no out-
ward consideration of the security priorities and working cul-
ture of individual organizations [25]. Organizations may dif-
fer in many ways, such as in their propensity (and arguably
the necessity) to exchange data to leverage business oppor-
tunities, and the behavior they wish to encourage within
employees regarding the data that they have at their dis-
posal [16].
Information security managers need to understand the us-
ability requirements of the staff within the organization who
must live with the consequences of their security decisions
[3]. Currently however there is a limited sense of how these
users perceive information security within the workplace,
and how they choose to react to it [9].
Previous work examining the use of removable USB data-
storage devices within organizations [5, 9, 13] has shown
that there is a need to consider human-behavioral factors
when managing information security policies and security
mechanisms. Here we seek to provide a standardized infor-
mation model for representing these behavioral factors, and
how they relate to the security needs of the organization.
We achieve this goal by augmenting the use of best prac-
tice information security standards with a structured defini-
tion of the associated human-behavioral implications, encap-
sulated within an ontology (i.e. an information model). This
informs the decision-making process, allowing managers to
account for the identifiable effects (be they direct or indirect)
that information security mechanisms have upon individuals
within the organization.
As an example, a highly-secure password authentication
policy may mandate that users use complex passwords, as a
means to reduce the chance of their passwords being guessed
or cracked, and thereby provide security. However, man-
dated password complexity may push some employees (strug-
gling to remember their passwords) to write them down in
an unsecured manner. This could conceivably result in a
less secure environment than would have been experienced
had simpler (and more easily memorized) passwords been
employed.
We frame our work within the context of information se-
curity standards compliance, with specific reference to the
ISO27002 guideline recommendations [2]. We have selected
specific guidelines, and identified potential policy decisions
that may be made during the course of their deployment.
We focus on those decisions that may impact upon both the
security of identified assets and the behavior of employees as
they use, or try to use, those assets in accordance with the
related security policy. This information is then structured
within the provided ontology.
Throughout this work we have consulted an industrial
partner representative (a senior information security man-
ager within a large, international financial organization),
who is responsible for the computer-system accounts of 50000
staff and 20000 contractors. The organization has success-
fully applied ISO27K standards, and so our consultations
have provided an insight into how our work might be used
in practice.
Section 2 discusses the background to our work, primar-
ily the need to consider human behavior as a component of
information security, and how use of an ontology can help
in doing so. Details of related work in information security
ontologies can also be found here. Section 3 introduces our
ontology and an example instance of the ontology relating
to password policy management. Section 4 provides an eval-
uation of the suitability and prospective use of the ontology,
followed by concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Information Security & Human Behavior
Information security managers have traditionally focused
upon technical controls (e.g. firewalls, e-mail filtering) as a
means to secure the information that an organization values.
However security managers can ill afford to ignore the hu-
man element within the organization [4, 16], which must be
put into perspective alongside the security and productivity
needs of the organization [10].
Organizations often aim to employ individuals who have
a willingness to take risks and exploit opportunities within
the workplace to benefit the organization itself. At the same
time, this behavior can be regarded as a human vulnerability,
as it can also create security incidents. Ill-informed or inap-
propriate attitudes to information security can cause a great
amount of damage, be it through careless talk, excessive or
accidental distribution of documents, or simply failing to
adhere to security procedures [20]. Employee behavior can
as such be knowingly insecure, intentionally malicious, or
a source of accidental security breaches [15]. That damage
can also be expressed in human and social terms, be it a loss
of reputation or a soured perception of the organization in
the eyes of potential customers or investors.
It is also necessary to develop a sense of the context within
which a particular pattern of behavior emerges. Behavior
that is beneficial to the organization in one sense (e.g., an-
swering queries from a colleague so as to help them in their
work) might constitute undesirable behavior in another (e.g.,
unknowingly answering queries that are part of a social en-
gineering attack meant to gather authentication details) [4].
This for instance could be resolved by targeted employee
education workshops, but managers need to know what be-
havior it is they are targeting in the first place.
When managing the human element in an information se-
curity context, it is necessary to consider both the impact
that security mechanisms will have upon the workforce and
how people will choose to react to those controls. An in-
dividual can ultimately make a decision whether to comply
with security policies, and they will be less willing to comply
if they perceive those policies as having a detrimental effect
upon their primary work tasks [10]. To justify the cost of
security controls, it is necessary to establish how effective
they are likely to be in practice [4].
The burden put upon an individual by a security control
can be measured in different ways, such as a restriction of
work capabilities, delayed tasks, or additional processes and
information to remember and recognize. This burden can
in turn have differing effects upon an individual’s attitude
towards security, for instance instilling a sense of frustration
or futility [19]. Inadvertently influencing a person’s attitude
in a negative way such as this only fuels the conscious choice
to circumvent security controls, or at the least hold them in
contempt [16].
A person’s attitude towards organizational security can
also influence their perception of how they are regarded by
their employers [4]. An individual is less likely to seek out
new business opportunities for an employer that they feel
does all it can to limit their ability to seek out these oppor-
tunities. If not properly managed, security controls could
become the tool that seemingly works against the goals of
the organization.
2.2 Taking Control
Organizations must cultivate an awareness of the human-
behavioral implications of their internal information secu-
rity decisions. The person best positioned to do so would
be the internal information security manager (CISO, CIO,
etc.) and, if applicable, any members of their team that
are normally included in the decision-making process. We
refer simply to the ‘CISO’ as a collective term for such an
individual.
Ideally those involved in the decision-making process would
have an awareness of the business goals of the organization
(and with this associated legal and financial concerns [24]).
The propensity for risk, as communicated by senior man-
agement, must be adequately represented in the information
security policies that are deployed across the organization.
Individual employees can (and arguably should) be capable
of behaving in a ‘risky’ manner to further the goals of the
organization. CISOs are in a position to ensure that the
right risks are free to be taken at the right time, and that
risks that senior management do not want to see being taken
are prevented all of the time. This provides a challenge to
clearly represent and communicate the directives of senior
management.
Predicting the usability needs of employees and tailoring
the information security infrastructure around them should
be a priority [25]. This is especially pertinent as an under-
standing of information security from a human-behavioral
perspective could in turn be used to promote positive se-
curity behaviors, thereby pacifying negative perceptions of
information security within the organization [4]. Such an
understanding could help in identifying, managing, and po-
tentially stemming the causes of persistent problems (e.g.
staff forgetting passwords), as opposed to perpetually react-
ing to the symptoms [16].
2.3 How an Ontology Can Help
Organizations are nowadays driven to frame their secu-
rity management processes within the context of external
security standards. Hence seeing human-behavioral factors
through the lens of internal information security controls is
not enough. External standards must be tailored to respect
the organizational culture, business priorities and usability
requirements of the employee base [25]. By aligning informa-
tion security guidance with the qualities of the organization,
standards compliance becomes more viable [30]. We assume
here that a CISO can pursue standards compliance with-
out jeopardizing their ability to accommodate the usability
requirements of staff with the same sense of priority.
A fully-informed view of information security within an
organization must then to some degree include internal con-
trols, external standards, and usability concerns. Provision
of a structured information model would go some way to-
wards achieving a holistic view of information security man-
agement such as this, in terms of its realization, intent, and
its impact upon members of the organization. For exam-
ple, if a standard recommends deployment of a password
authentication system to protect valuable data, a model can
be used to relate its properties to the CISO’s password pol-
icy decisions and the projected end-user experience.
Representing such a view in an ontology would be appro-
priate for a number of reasons:
• By providing a taxonomy of information security ter-
minology, there is scope for security engineers to broaden
their knowledge of related concepts [34], in this case
the human-behavioral implications of their security de-
cisions.
• By encapsulating a standardized taxonomy of concepts
and terms, an ontology can provide a common lan-
guage [35], with the potential for improved commu-
nication of information security needs and decisions
[34]. Differing “auras of understanding”, as may be
seen between senior management and CISOs, can then
be clearly identified and bridged.
• Ontology content can be re-appropriated for other uses,
and developed over time [35].
• Use of an ontology provides opportunities for interop-
erability, not least between different assessment method-
ologies or software tools [36]. This has the potential to
generate new knowledge.
• To represent information security terminology in an
ontology it is necessary to reduce a diverse array of
terms, concepts and relations into a more refined, struc-
tured information model. This serves to organize and
make precise any knowledge and process information.
To be effective it is necessary to relate the human-behavioral
implications of information security to the content of exter-
nal standards. We should also develop some sense of how
research pertaining to the human-behavioral implications of
information security can be aligned with the requirements of
a CISO. This requires a means of representing the complex
interrelationships between the different concepts of human
behavior and information security.
For this purpose the work undergone here provides an on-
tology that can be used to demonstrate the potential human-
behavioral implications of information security decisions within
the context of identified external standards. With this, we
approach the challenge of determining how and what infor-
mation should be represented. Human behavior is arguably
too rich and varied to be reduced to an ontology, however
we aim to provide the foundation necessary to relate human-
behavioral usability factors to technical and procedural se-
curity controls.
With our work, the information security decision-making
process can be afforded recognition of those instances where
the capabilities of security mechanisms reach their limit, and
where security can only be strengthened by influencing the
human-behavioral factors at play.
2.4 RelatedWork in Information Security On-
tologies & Taxonomies
A number of ontologies have already been developed for
purposes relating to information security. It is useful to re-
view these works to better understand what is required of an
ontology that relates information security, human-behavior
and business concerns.
Work by G.B. Magklaras & S.M. Furnell [41] provides a
tool for estimating the level of threat originating from an
organization insider, through the configuration and evalua-
tion of user behavior profiles. The argument here is that
“all actions that constitute IT misuse lead back to human
factors”, and furthermore that individuals within an orga-
nization have greater access capabilities than those outside.
A taxonomy was developed to represent properties of users.
This taxonomy includes different behavioral motivations, i.e.
intentional and unintentional behavior (e.g. “deliberate ig-
norance of rules”, “inadequate system knowledge”). There
are also basic representations of the (traceable) technical-
level consequences of insider threats, as well as role defini-
tions based upon user capabilities (e.g. “advanced user”). It
is proposed that this taxonomy be used to profile individ-
ual users within an organization, and that these profiles be
correlated with related system activity to determine the ex-
tent of the threat posed by each system user (e.g. “potential
threat”, “harmless”). This work supports the point that a
particular pattern of behavior can have a number of causes,
and that a CISO needs to consider the possible outcomes of
introducing users and technologies. It also reminds us that
we can only manage user behavior that is detectable, and
that in our case we need at the least to consider how user
behaviors are communicated to the CISO (either directly or
through cross-departmental consultation, for instance).
Another investigation into the misuse of information is de-
scribed in the work of Braz et al [32]. This work is interesting
to us as it discusses using high-level policies to mitigate pro-
cedural threats. For instance, “verify source of information”
would be used to manage a threat of“customer provides false
info”. The work goes on to describe how policies can be com-
bined, and appropriately implemented as technical security
controls. It is often difficult to manage the behavior of in-
dividuals with a single security mechanism without stifling
the same elements that make them useful to an organization.
This work demonstrates the concept of composing controls
to influence the potential behaviors within a particular pro-
cess. Furthermore it also provides examples of information
security directives that do not necessarily prohibit activities,
but can instead be used to ensure their correctness according
to organizational policy.
The ROPE methodology [39] and related security ontol-
ogy [14] provide organization-wide evaluation of IT secu-
rity management, with a focus on business processes and
risk-management. The ontology encapsulates well-known
information security concepts such as assets, vulnerabili-
ties, threats and controls. These inter-related concepts are
used as a framework for structuring organization-specific
knowledge, which is used both for high-level decision-making
and as input to the ROPE risk assessment process. The
work in [39] and [14] illustrates use of organized infrastruc-
ture knowledge as a tool in a holistic security management
decision-making process. Our work aims to provide a simi-
larly ‘global view’ of organizational priorities, aligning secu-
rity and business objectives. The security ontology in [14]
also stresses the need of IT managers to represent and com-
municate qualities of the IT infrastructure to senior man-
agement, as a means to better justify their security deci-
sions and reduce the reliance on intuition. We also aim to
utilize an ontology to structure and communicate informa-
tion security decisions, although at this stage we assume
less that intuition will be used, but more that our work can
augment and unify disparate assessment methodologies (e.g.
as relate to risk assessment or projections of infrastructure
investment).
A security ontology incorporating external standards is
described in the work of Fenz et al [33]. Here individual
guidelines from the ISO27001/2 standards are related to
tangible security control implementations within an orga-
nization. This provides a means of structuring and assess-
ing internal security policies within the framework of ISO
standards. This facilitates a process that requires less effort
to align external information security standards with inter-
nal policies. These qualities are intended to enable smaller
organizations to approach standards compliance, by system-
atizing more of the compliance process.
The ontology created in [33] acts as the foundation for a
software application provided to manage the assessment of
security control effectiveness. The work is built upon in [6]
to provide a methodology and tools for stipulating control-
selection criteria while pursuing ISO27001 compliance. We
envisage that our work could also be augmented with rel-
evant assessment tools, albeit not as tightly as is demon-
strated here.
Work by Seok-Won Lee et al [38] describes the derivation
of security requirements from external standards (including
US Department of Defense guidelines). The work provides
a process for determining interdependencies across content
from different standards, and the development of question-
naires for use in adapting standards to internal security con-
figurations. This work demonstrates adaptation of natural-
language security standards to internal security infrastruc-
tures, including the identification and association of assets,
threats, vulnerabilities and controls to guideline content re-
quirements, by way of information models. This approach
is used to help predict and understand how standards will
function in practice, by relating them to an organization’s
technical infrastructure. In our work we use an ontology to
relate standard content to the perception and compliance
of individuals towards security within an organization, by
way of the effects that the security infrastructure has upon
internal working practices.
OntoSec [36] is a security ontology for use in structuring
security alerts within the security function of an organiza-
tion. This work aims to provide a standardized taxonomy for
security events originating from disparate security mecha-
nisms, and represent the relationships between these events.
Usage data from security mechanisms is translated into on-
tology content, and tools are provided to facilitate querying
of this data to identify patterns of network security events.
A security manager would then use this information to ef-
ficiently develop controls based upon the recorded qualities
of previous computer security incidents. In our work we
also develop an ontology as a means to structure knowl-
edge about past events for use by a security manager (in
our case a CISO). However instead of sample data relat-
ing to security controls, we intend to populate our ontology
with observations and structured reasoning as derived from
informed research into the usability of information security
policy mandates.
2.5 Requirements
The previous discussions regarding information security
ontologies and human behavior have highlighted a number
of requirements that we must consider when developing an
ontology:
• The behavior of staff should adequately represent the
organization’s business and risk management strate-
gies. The usability and security behaviors of staff must
then be considered as part of an organization’s infor-
mation security policies. This includes identification
of:
– the vulnerabilities that IT users create;
– the intentional or unintentional threats user ac-
tions pose to organizational assets and the infor-
mation security infrastructure, and;
– the potential process controls that may be em-
ployed to manage user behavior, and their iden-
tifiable effects upon that behavior.
• Information security mechanisms are guided by poli-
cies. These policies are increasingly informed by ex-
ternal standards. This should be recognized and ac-
commodated in the ontology.
• CISOs must be able to relate the content of the on-
tology to the information security infrastructure they
manage, and the decisions they make regarding this in-
frastructure. Ontology elements representing human
factors and external standards should then be com-
bined in a manner that will prove useful in the infor-
mation security decision-making process.
Asset
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Guideline
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Figure 1: Overview of the information security ontology.
3. DESIGN
Here we introduce an ontology that represents attributes
of external information security standards, and aligns these
with the potential human-behavioral implications of their im-
plementation. This requires us to divide the content of a
standard into its constituent components, reaching a level
where individual security processes and controls can be as-
sociated with the usability concerns that they may illicit in
practice. In this sense we essentially overlay a human factors
ontology onto an information security ontology.
Within the ontology we represent the security weaknesses
of an organization’s assets. These weaknesses may promote
or inhibit certain employee behaviors. These behavior pat-
terns are then modeled as potential threats. These may be
threats to security (e.g., an employee persistently forgetting
a password and choosing to have it written down in clear
view) or threats to productivity (e.g., an employee forgetting
a password, then requesting the password be reset, thereby
being unable to continue their primary task in the interim).
We further represent the procedural control decisions that a
CISO can enact to manage those threats.
We regard external standards as the framework for our
ontology. We assume that information security managers
should have the capacity to intentionally or otherwise stray
beyond the static definition of compliance if they believe it to
be beneficial to the organization. The context then becomes
the achievement of a balance between security, user policy
compliance and budget/board constraints. An instance of
the ontology can provide record of the approaches taken to-
wards specific security (and arguably business) risks, which
the CISO then uses as evidence for making judgments.
Our work uses the ISO/IEC 27002 standard [2] as a frame-
work within which to develop the content for our ontol-
ogy. The recommendations of the ISO27002 standard are
intended to be built upon an Information Security Man-
agement System (ISMS) as described in the accompanying
ISO27001 standard [1]. We make a similar distinction to the
one made in [33], separating the controls detailed in the stan-
dard into ‘hard’, physical security aspects and ‘soft’, organi-
zational security aspects. At this point we do not consider
‘softer’ controls (e.g. those concerned with user education
& training).
We do not consider technical- or configuration-level con-
cerns in our ontology (e.g. the mandated length of pass-
words or the required character sets). New or alternative
technologies tend to emerge with greater regularity than se-
curity standards, and so we focus on high-level, procedural
controls. Other works make a similar distinction, so as to
focus on the development of high-level process controls that
then guide technical-level solutions (e.g., [22, 32, 35]).
During development of our ontology, we followed the ad-
vice for creation of ontologies outlined in [40]. Adhering to
the associated recommendations guaranteed that the struc-
ture of our ontology would be consistent, robust and usable.
Our ontology has been implemented in the Ontology Web
Language (OWL) [17]. We use OWL as it is a well-supported
ontology language, and there are code libraries available to
facilitate building software applications on top of the ontol-
ogy in the future should we choose to do so. We used the
Prote´ge´ Ontology Editor application [18] to construct the
ontology and enter data for our applied example (as further
detailed in Section 3.7).
3.1 Overview
As shown in Figure 1, our ontology is comprised of a num-
ber of different concepts. Each individual concept has a re-
lationship with one or more other concepts. The objects
Chapter, Section, Guideline and Guideline Step provide
representation of content from the ISO27002 information se-
curity standard. An individual Guideline can be associated
with a particular Asset by way of the ’hasSubject’ rela-
tion. Otherwise if a Guideline is broken down into more
refined Guideline Steps it will be these that are linked to
Assets. We represent those Assets identified in a Guideline
or Guideline Step that either must be secured or which are
crucial to a security process. In our ontology an Asset can
be ’ownedBy’ someone that has an identified Role.
It is with the Vulnerability object class that we intro-
duce human-behavioral factors into the ontology. The se-
curity or usability of an Asset could be put at risk by an
identifiable form of human behavior (e.g., “memorization of
password difficult”).
A Vulnerability may be ’exploitedBy’ a Threat (e.g.,
“password forgotten”), which renders the Asset unusable
or insecure. A Threat may be either an Infrastructure
Threat or a Procedural Threat. The former represent ac-
tivities within the security infrastructure that impact upon
the usability of security mechanisms, whereas the latter rep-
resent events within a security-oriented process where hu-
mans interact with security mechanisms. With each Proce-
dural Threat we record the Behavioral Foundation of the
threat, as a means of classifying behaviors and indicating
the concerns that they raise within the organization (e.g.,
someone’s memory capabilities or attitude towards security
in the workplace).
A Vulnerability may be ’mitigatedBy’ a Behavior Con-
trol. A Behavior Control represents a procedural activ-
ity that can be enacted to manage the interactions between
humans and organizational security controls. Each Behav-
ior Control has a Control Type which indicates the risk
management approach it takes, so that a Behavior Control
’managesRiskOf’ a specific Threat.
Further details regarding each of these concepts and their
interrelationships are described in the following sections.
3.2 Chapter, Section, Guideline & Guideline
Step
In the case of the ISO27002 external standard, content
is broken into Chapters. Each Chapter refers to a gen-
eral area of information security management (e.g. “Access
Control”, “User Training & Education”). Each Chapter has
a number of Sections, which each address specific areas
of the Chapter’s subject matter. Each Section describes
a number of Guidelines, detailing specific procedural con-
cerns (e.g. “User Password Configuration”, “Notifying New
Employees of Terms of Use”). For each Guideline in the
ISO27002 document there are a series of ‘Implementation
Guidance’ Steps (referred to here as Guideline Steps), de-
scribing prescribed methods for achieving compliance with
the named guideline. An individual Guideline Step then
describes some best-practice advice on how to safeguard a
named asset within the wider process.
We resolve the discourse between external standards and
infrastructure concepts (such as threats and controls) by as-
sociating infrastructure concerns with specific Guidelines
or, where a Guideline has been refined further, individ-
ual Guideline Steps. We accept that the standards struc-
ture we have chosen is tightly-bound to the structure of the
ISO27002 document. However, it is not inconceivable for
other external standards to be modeled also (owing to the
natural extensibility provided with use of an ontology).
3.3 Asset
Within the ontology an Asset is an identifiable artifact
which is of value to the organization (be it monetary or as
a means to further the organization’s business goals). This
could be something tangible such as a computer or printer,
or something intangible such as sensitive business knowl-
edge. By identifying the assets which are of importance to
the organization, and the security processes that can be em-
ployed to secure those assets (as detailed in the ISO27002
standard), it is possible to begin informing the development
of internal policies for their protection.
The ontology must reflect or represent the asset mani-
fest of the organization. It is then appropriate to record
the ’owner’ of the Asset, which may be selected from an
organization-specific set of role definitions.
3.4 Vulnerability
An Asset may exhibit some weakness that makes it sus-
ceptible to exploitation (either directly or indirectly). Such
a weakness is referred to as a Vulnerability. We choose to
concentrate our efforts on identifying those vulnerabilities
exposed in security processes that may be exploited directly
or indirectly by human behavior, whether that behavior is
intentionally malicious or unintentional (such as mistakes or
oversights). An example of such a Vulnerability would be
burdening a user with an additional password to remember,
which on top of having to already remember any number of
work-related passwords may cause that individual to forget
or confuse one or more old and new passwords.
At this stage we rely on the judgment of the CISO to de-
termine whether a given Vulnerability is exhibited by their
information security infrastructure. Since each Vulnerabil-
ity we identify is based in a potential pattern of behavior,
and less in a technical configuration, this essentially requires
a judgment on the capabilities and working culture of the
workforce.
With this we consider both behavior that affects security
and security that affects behavior, as one can influence the
other. A Threat (described in Section 3.5) to a Vulnera-
bility essentially constitutes the former, and a Behavior
Control (see Section 3.6) the latter. As an example, if in a
given organization a culture of complete trust was in effect, a
password-authentication system might not be deployed, but
deploying such a system might make individuals question
who and what they trust.
3.5 Threat
An Asset may be perceived as vulnerable to some form of
exploitation, but that is not to say that it will necessarily be
exploited. A Vulnerability becomes a problem when there
is some means of exploiting it (a Threat) and a probability
of that Threat manifesting.
In our ontology we make a distinction between those threats
that affect the infrastructure of an organization (e.g. “IT
help desk too busy to answer password-reset requests”), and
threats that affect the human-oriented procedures and us-
ability requirements inherent in using a particular Asset
(e.g. “user has forgotten system log-on password”). We refer
to the former as Infrastructure Threats, and the latter as
Procedural Threats.
Note that the Threats that we consider may not directly
affect the security of an organization’s Assets. However,
they may otherwise have an effect upon productivity, and so
should any such Threats manifest, they may adversely affect
an individual’s attitude to security. If security measures are
not attuned to an individual’s usability requirements, they
Table 1: Types of Behavioral Foundation
Cultural Different cultural practices may exist across geographic (or perhaps even social) boundaries
Ethical Basic ethical considerations should be noted, e.g. personal privacy
Temporal
Conditional changes may exist based upon the time of day or the duration of an event (e.g. employees
may lose focus on their work or have diminished patience at the end of the working day)
Mindset
Someone’s disposition could indicate that they may behave maliciously or opportunistically with
respect to the organization’s assets
Capability
There may be individuals within the workforce who have some form of physical impairment.
This may affect their ability to interact with security mechanisms
Table 2: Refined ‘Mindset’ types
NAME ASSOCIATION INTENT DESCRIPTION
Friend Internal Non-Malicious
A Friend may behave in an unintentionally non-secure way, or may
otherwise be unaware of the value of security in relation to their
primary task
Outsider External Non-Malicious
A party outside of the organization who, like a Friend, can be assumed
to never have any malicious intentions. However, just like a Friend an
Outsider may exploit a vulnerability unintentionally
Traitor Internal Malicious
Assumed to have malicious, targeted intentions. A Traitor seeks out
specific assets within the organization, and the means to exploit those
assets
Foe External Malicious
A malicious party operating outside of the organization. A Foe can be
assumed to have intentions to obtain or exploit specific assets. A Foe
could be an individual hired by the organization, e.g. hardware/software
support staff, or even a business partner
Opportunist Internal Opportunistic
May be someone inside the organization who has malicious intentions
with no particular target. An Opportunist will exploit any vulnerability,
for personal gain or satisfaction (e.g. amusement)
Outside Opportunist External Opportunistic The external equivalent of an Opportunist
may feel inclined to sidestep security measures that they
regard as cumbersome in order to “get the job done”. As
such, we identify potential Threats to the desirable security
behavior of an organization.
We record the potential consequences of each Threat should
it occur (as also provided by e.g., [36, 37]). We do so infor-
mally, although effort is made to represent the consequences
in terms of the potential impact of a Threat upon individu-
als within the organization.
Regarding the probability of a Threat manifesting, we as-
sume that a CISO would use their own experience to de-
termine the likelihood of a Threat occurring, or more likely
some methodologies external to the ontology. There is also
no sense of the passage of time within the ontology, and
as such no measure of how compounded security behaviors
may affect an individual (i.e. how human-behavioral im-
plications may influence each other when aggregated from
multiple Threats over time).
3.5.1 Procedural Threat
Procedural Threats are essentially events that constitute
a conflict of usability and security instigated by an individ-
ual within the organization. It is beneficial to have a basic
understanding of the aspect of individual or societal behav-
ior that drives the Procedural Threat. We refer to this as
its Behavioral Foundation. The Behavioral Foundation
then allows us to classify a Procedural Threat, and exam-
ine it in the context of the desirable security behavior of
the organization. Table 1 shows a table of the basic types
of Behavioral Foundation that we have considered in our
work.
The Behavioral Foundation also informs the level of sen-
sitivity required when addressing a Procedural Threat. An
individual who tells a ‘trusted’ colleague their password in
confidence in case they believe they might forget it them-
selves should be approached differently to an individual who,
without prompting, tells their password to a colleague sim-
ply because they do not acknowledge the security value of
that password. The solution changes based upon the nature
of the Threat. Forgetfulness may (or may not) be accom-
modated by placing reminder signs in prominent places or
through security training workshops. Ignorance might be
stemmed through the careful use of sanctions (thereby forc-
ing the individual to address the source of their own igno-
rance).
In the case of a person’s security ‘Mindset’ we have seen
fit to define the scope of different actor behaviors, based on
those defined in [9]. These relate motives to behavior, as
a marker to refine the means of altering or countering that
motive. One potential application of refining the scope of a
Behavioral Foundation would be in establishing which as-
pects of the information security policy should be targeted
within staff education programs (e.g. relating to the dis-
closure of personal security details to outside callers). The
refined behavior types within the scope of the ‘Mindset’ Be-
havioral Foundation are shown in Table 2. Refined scopes
for other kinds of Behavioral Foundation can also be de-
fined.
3.6 Behavior Control
There may be a number of methods available for the man-
agement of each human-behavioral Vulnerability. We ap-
proach each individual Vulnerability through the potential
application of system-wide policy or infrastructure changes.
We then refer to these high-level directives as Behavior
Controls. We would for example consider a mechanism of
policy change at a level of “make passwords more complex”
over “include one or more punctuation characters in man-
Table 3: Types of Risk Approach
Retention Explicit acceptance of any risks that arise from the existence of an identified Threat
Reduction Identifies a Behavior Control that is deployed in an attempt to reduce the possibility of a Threat manifesting
Transfer
Used to record those Behavior Controls managed by an external party. It could also apply to a distinct and separate
function within the organization (e.g. the transfer of password reset burden onto the internal IT help desk function)
Avoidance Action may be taken to completely avoid an identified Threat
dated password content”.
Since each Behavioral Control essentially describes a pro-
cedural solution, it is up to the judgment of the CISO to de-
cide how to enact the control in reality. Our approach leaves
a CISO free to consider different solutions equally, without
necessarily favoring one over the other. Our methodology
also aligns with the use of external standards, as standards
typically prioritize processes over technologies.
Work by Neubauer et al [6] discusses representing “coun-
termeasure side-effects”. Our ontology represents the usability-
oriented side-effects of deploying a Behavior Control by
way of its human-behavioral implications. In our ontology
it is possible for a Behavior Control to have its own associ-
ated Vulnerability types. For instance, an unwieldy pass-
word authentication system could be mitigated by relying on
token-based security - it is then conceivable that employees
could lose their tokens. In this sense our ontology can inform
information security managers of the human-behavioral im-
plications of the Behavior Controls they intend to imple-
ment.
3.6.1 Control Types
Decisions relating to information security management
must be explicitly agreed by senior management if they
are to have the resources they need. This is not simply
a case of mitigating every Vulnerability or neutralizing
every Threat, as senior management may regard the associ-
ated costs or resultant restrictions on user behavior as too
great to be justified. The choices that are made must reflect
both the organization’s stance towards risk propensity and
its working culture. These can only be determined through
communication with those who run the organization.
To this end we associate a Control Type with each Behav-
ior Control, as a record of the risk management approach
that the control offers towards a particular Threat. A table
of the basic risk approaches we use is shown in Table 3.
An example of the use of Control Types might be with
passwords that are difficult to remember. There is a Threat
that staff may forget their passwords, which could be tar-
geted by making passwords simpler. However, another Be-
havior Control might be to maintain the same policy, but
employ IT help desk staff to deal with password resets. This
does not make passwords any easier to remember (thereby
side-stepping the Threat), but manages the implications of
the Vulnerability. In this sense a Behavior Control can
be used to promote a specific vision of ideal security behav-
ior within working practices.
A stakeholder role can be associated with each Behavior
Control to clarify who should be consulted before enact-
ing a particular process strategy. For instance, choosing to
enforce complex passwords is likely to result in a number
of passwords being forgotten, and with this a number of
password-reset requests being directed to the organization’s
IT help desk (if they have one). The manager of the help
desk would need to be consulted in this event.
3.7 Example - Password Policy
To assess the efficacy of our work we examined specific
ISO27002 guidelines and encoded them in the ontology. Here
we examine one of those examples.
Researchers have already investigated the usability issues
associated with passwords (e.g., [7, 8, 11]). Here we aim to
align some of the concepts of this research with the act of
maintaining compliance with an external standard (in this
case ISO27002). By combining existing information security
standards and methodical research regarding usability is-
sues, we bring together industry-proven management guide-
lines and assessments of structured research observations.
To provide an example of how our ontology might be ap-
plied, we examined existing research to identify issues that
users typically raise when using passwords (e.g. “forgetting
password”, “use of recall aids”).
We selected a guideline within the ISO27002 standard re-
lating to password policy, specifically Guideline Step (b)
of Guideline 11.3.1, “Password Use”. We then identified a
user’s Password as the Asset requiring immediate protection
(since it can be implied that gaining a Password gains ac-
cess to business data). Once the Asset had been identified,
we conceived a series of human-behavioral Vulnerability
types, Threats and Controls that must be considered.
The ontology then serves to represent the possible permu-
tations of perception relating to passwords, as viewed from
the perspectives of both a human user and a CISO within
an organization. A sample of the example ontology con-
tent is shown in Figure 2. This sample focuses on one root
Vulnerability relating to a user’s Password.
Within the example we identify a number of concerns
linked to password policy, as described in the following dis-
cussions. By describing these concerns we illustrate that a
CISO must understand the impact that their information
security decisions will have upon individuals within the or-
ganization, both in the behavior that these decisions elicit,
and the behaviors that must be carefully managed to main-
tain security.
3.7.1 Password Memorization
From the identified Asset Password, there is a Vulner-
ability entitled “Single Password Memorization Difficult”.
This represents the possibility that an individual could have
trouble remembering a password of the complexity required
by the organization’s password policy.
There are a number of behavioral Threats which may ex-
ploit this weakness. A Password may be forgotten, perhaps
due to an individual’s Capability (or more precisely their
memory). The consequence of this would be that the in-
dividual would be without system access until they could
remember their password or have it changed.
The organization may accept that this is a possibility and
choose to “Maintain Password Policy” as a Behavior Con-
trol (choosing perceived security over usability). Otherwise
a choice may be made to“Make Password Easier To Remem-
Figure 2: Sample of ontology content relating to password policy.
ber”, thereby reducing the chance of someone forgetting their
Password (potentially at the cost of perceived security).
3.7.2 Managing Password Recall Methods
If an individual is having difficulty remembering a Pass-
word, it is possible that they will for instance write their
Password down, or use some other form of external record
of the Password to avoid the need to recall it when needed.
An insecure record of the Password (e.g., a piece of note pa-
per next to the user’s workstation) could then be exploited
by a malicious party.
One method of reducing the need for users to record their
Password externally would be to “Educate Users in Recall
Techniques”, helping them learn to remember Passwords
with less effort. Another approach to the problem of in-
secure records of Passwords would be to enforce a ‘clear
desk’ policy, whereby users are not permitted to leave any
artifacts at their desks which may contain or allude to se-
cure information. This Behavior Control does not solve
the problem of users forgetting their passwords, but would
reduce the range of insecure behaviors that users exhibit.
3.7.3 Password Reset Function
Organizations can choose to rely on internal IT help desk
facilities to balance the security and usability of passwords
[8]. This then allows a staff member to make a request to
have their Password reset to a known string of characters
(which they then may be able to remember, or otherwise
may forget again).
If the password policy is fixed, staff could be provided with
the option to utilize a “Helpdesk Password Reset Manage-
ment” Control function. This would then transfer the cost
of managing forgotten passwords to an internal or external
helpdesk team.
If an IT helpdesk team must carry the cost of users forget-
ting their Passwords, it is likely that such a cost would be
measured in the number of reset requests that the helpdesk
must respond to. It is possible that if a great number of
system users are having difficulty remembering their pass-
words that the helpdesk will be too busy to answer requests
promptly. This would extend the time for which callers are
without access to the system. One obvious solution is to
employ “Additional Helpdesk Staff” in an effort to reduce
the number of callers left waiting to be answered.
An individual may find the “Password Reset Process La-
borious”, growing impatient with the time it requires. A
consequence of this would be a reduced willingness to com-
ply with the process, especially if it detracts from the calling
individual’s primary work tasks. One answer to this would
be to introduce an“Automated Password Reset System”(as-
suming here that such a system would require less time than
a helpdesk member to issue a new Password).
One final Vulnerability introduced by use of a helpdesk
function is that a member of the helpdesk team must typ-
ically be provided with details verifying the identity of a
caller (to ensure the distribution of passwords to the correct
recipients). However, a malicious party within the helpdesk
team may exploit these details to gain access to an individ-
ual’s system account. There is then the need to consider that
employing a helpdesk function to increase usability may also
introduce its own security problems.
4. EVALUATION
4.1 Applicability
During development of our ontology and example content
we consulted a large IT consultancy, a representative from a
large financial organization, and human factors researchers.
This provided insight into the requirements and usability
needs of prospective users of the ontology.
With reference to the ontology evaluation criteria outlined
in [27], consultation with potential users of the ontology has
provided us with assessment of its syntax, usability and con-
tent requirements. In consulting human factors researchers
regarding our password policy example (as described in Sec-
tion 3.7), we made effective use of expert knowledge to guar-
antee the completeness, correctness, and consistency of the
ontology content that we have developed.
By following guidance on ontology development [40] and
encoding our ontology in OWL, we have served to demon-
strate that the concepts in our ontology are well-defined and
that the relationships between those concepts are precise.
The use of OWL also provides us with application-based
evaluation of the ontology content [29].
4.2 Envisaged Use of the Ontology
Our ontology has the potential to provide a unique per-
spective on the human-behavioral factors associated with
information security standards compliance.
Ideally organizations would have both an IT security an-
alyst and a human-behavioral expert in their employ. With
this we envisage that distinct surveys would be conducted
to identify specific information security mechanisms as de-
scribed in an external standard, along with the associated
human-behavioral concerns.
Concerning external standards and their place in our on-
tology, we would advocate the decomposition of standards
into policy directives by way of a top-down approach, as
described in [42]. This involves breaking a standard down
into individual guidelines, which then form the requirements
for the development of internal security policies. It is nec-
essary for CISOs to translate these policies into a workable
solution for distribution across the organization [24]. We
envisage that our ontology would be used as a precursor
to this translation process, providing a perspective on how
policy directives might affect employee behavior before those
directives are realized.
We envisage that population of the ontology with poten-
tial human-behavioral implications and controls will require
targeted studies relating to each specific security mechanism
to be conducted. We have already demonstrated in our ex-
ample how research relating to human factors in password
authentication mechanisms can be appropriately incorpo-
rated into our ontology, by associating structured expert
knowledge with relevant guideline recommendations in the
ISO27002 standard.
Population of the ontology with human-behavioral proper-
ties would rely for the most part on the examination of secu-
rity behaviors that are readily observable i.e. high-frequency
events that have a limited, perhaps predictable impact upon
the security infrastructure or the security behavior of the
employee base. Although this approach is not immediately
able to identify rare, potentially complex and high-impact
events [26] it may however be possible for a CISO to use
our ontology to better envisage the composition of multiple
human activities, as typically contribute to complex security
incidents.
The ISO27K standards that we have examined in this
work inform the management of business risk as relates to
information security. It is as such logical to include rep-
resentatives from each area of the organization affected by
information security in the compliance process [23]. Our
ontology is well-placed to provide natural language recom-
mendations in a structured manner, promoting an inclusive
approach to information security management.
An approach of consultation similar to that described in
[31] would facilitate effective use of our ontology within a
particular organization. Herein a first step is to identify
business processes and security properties within the orga-
nization e.g., Assets, Threats, Controls etc., as for instance
identified in existing resource manifests (a process wherein
use of an ontology is recommended). The Threats and Con-
trols would in this case be the behavioral processes that may
either manifest or be imposed upon the organization’s staff.
Our ontology provides a unifying medium for communi-
cating the usability requirements of different departments
and work roles to the security function, as the potential
threats to productivity and opportunities to promote secu-
rity behaviors are made more apparent through its content.
Following from this we would rely on information security
managers to use the gathered information to make judg-
ments regarding their management options. This judgment
process may be augmented with other forms of risk/benefit
calculations. The primary use of our ontology is as a guide
to the usability factors that must be addressed when deriv-
ing information security policy within an organization, and
so we would assume that the ontology would be integrated
into a broader framework of external standards and industry
best-practice knowledge.
5. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the need to understand the usabil-
ity requirements and attitudes towards security that exist
within an organization, so as to ensure that information se-
curity management is effective. We have built upon this with
an information security ontology that combines the content
of external information security standards with explicit rep-
resentation of potential human-oriented security concerns.
This ontology provides a framework within which to inves-
tigate the human-behavioral implications of information se-
curity management decisions before security controls are de-
ployed.
We conclude that it is possible for organizations to con-
solidate information security policies with human-behavioral
considerations, and that this process can be facilitated
through use of a specialized ontology. Our ontology has
demonstrated that expert knowledge of usability factors in
information security can be associated with information se-
curity infrastructure properties. We have shown that our
method of associating security infrastructure properties with
their human-behavioral implications can identify potential
user behaviors or effects upon this behavior before they are
realized within the organization. This knowledge can be
used to promote more usable security infrastructures.
Alongside this work we have been actively investigating
the usability issues of the ontology from the perspective of
an information security manager. For this purpose we have
been progressively integrating the ontology into a prototype
‘Knowledge Base’ application [28].
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